Future Battletank Hoax, Part 2

Yesterday's Future Tanks that WILL NEVER HAPPEN, Part 2

annotated by Blacktail

This article was originally titled, "The Main Battle
Tank: Future Developments - A British Perspective" and was written by Major S. W. Crawford, RTR, and published in Armor Magazine's January~February issue.
This guy has a pretty warped interpretation of Main Battle Tank development trends... as you will see below.

DISCLAIMER: The "Fair Use Doctrine", in Section 107 of the US Copyright Code, gives me the right to duplicate the original work for non-profit educational purposes. I am aware that I do not have the right to use this intellectual property for profit, and I have no intention to, nor does any other party have my permission
to do so.

[Continued from Part 1]

However well protected an MBT may be in the primary threat arcs, the restrictions of weight and size dictate that armor on the sides, rear, and top and belly, will be lighter, and therefore more susceptible to penetration ["Lighter" does not immediately entail "Weaker", nor even "Thinner" --- only Whoppertanktards fully believe such idiocy]. Accepting that penetration will happen on occasion, there are a number of measures which can be used to minimize the damage. Spall liners can defeat low levels of residual penetration, while body armor is already worn by many nation's tank crews for the same purpose. British tank crews currently have neither spall liners nor body armor, although there are plans for both [Here's my own proposal for British Tanker body armor; PUT ON A VEST, AND ZIP IT UP --- for spall liners; SCROUNGE KEVLAR AND SUPERGLUE]. They will undoubtedly become standard in the future.

The greatest danger following penetration, however, is that of an ammunition fire [Still like the idea of a liquid propellant charge?]. Propellants that burn slowly in the open [Not if they're liquid!] will detonate when confined, with disastrous consequences for vehicle and crew. Attempts have been made with sealed, fire-extinguishing charge bins to nip ammunition fires in the bud, but as the propellant itself can contain the necessary oxygen for combustion, this is only partially successful. In British tanks, propellant has traditionally been stowed below the turret ring, but the rationale behind this may now be obsolete, as previously
discussed. Perhaps the FRG and U.S. current practice of turret bustle stowage with blow-off panels is the way ahead. Crew compartment fire suppression systems, like that of Leopard 2, have their main task in putting out hydraulic fires [Not a problem in the Leopard 2 anymore --- now their GCS is now ALL-ELECTRICAL]caused by damage to the gun control equipment (GCE) and small
fires in oil and rag waste [What is RAG WASTE doing in a tank?!] and
other peripheral equipments. Such systems are likely to be a feature of future MBTs, although it is interesting to note that Leclerc uses the safer electrical GCE and the FRG are considering an electrical system for retrofit to Leopard 2.

Fuel fires present a lesser hazard [Tell that to M1 Abrams tankers, who sit on top of 505 gallons of JET FUEL], with fuel being generally stored in self-sealing tanks. Indeed, diesel has been proposed as a suitable outside layer for ammunition stowage bins with the idea that it will cool down penetrating splinters and thus prevent ammunition fires. Diesel fuel is particularly effective at suppressing shaped-charge attack, as long as the attack is below the fuel/air interface.

So much for direct protection. Indirect protection has just as important a role to play in enhancing the survivability of the tank. This form of protection can be achieved by the combination of a host of factors such as size, agility, silhouette, use of camouflage, tactical handling, and the more recently developed techniques of signature reduction. As already mentioned, adoption of the autoloader can reduce the overall height of an MBT [Not if you use an External Gun Turret with it --- in the AGS competition, the only competitor with an EGT was 3 inches taller than the winning vehicle (M8 Buford) which used a REGULAR turret with guys in it] because there is no need to provide room for a standing human loader [How about room for stowage of equipment and supplies, genius?]. Indeed, autoloading may allow future MBTs to mount the gun externally and dramatically reduce the size [I just debunked that] and vulnerability [No one in the turret means no one at the highest point of the vehicles height; that means less visibility, even IF you remote-out the optics; less visibility means less SURVIVABILITY. Then there's the inescapable paradigm of putting the whole crew into one tiny compartment where one Sabot penetrator from the side will kill them all] of the vehicle. Battlefield agility, a function of an MBT's acceleration and speed across country, can reduce exposure times during movement and thus considerably enhance survivability [only if you don't sacrifice ENDURANCE to get this --- the US military learned this the hard way, via the M1 Abrams and it's 152 miles between breakdowns]. In extreme cases, a highly mobile tank can outperform the traversing performance of an enemy turret, a capability claimed for the Cromwell when faced with the German Tiger in the last war [The Tiger didn't take 8 seconds to slew 360 degrees, unlike the M1, T-80, Leclerc, etc.].

It is in the field of signature reduction, however, where the most subtle enhancements to survivability may be made. The value of camouflage has long been understood [Not by the US Army --- behold it's Dark Green tanks driving through the Light Tan deserts of Iraq], and research continues into better patterns, paints, and materials. IR-defeating materials have been fielded for some time, and methods to counter TI surveillance are now developed. Much can be done in the future at the design stage to ensure that exhausts are shielded and hot fumes dispersed [Yet, the author STILL wants to put a Gas Turbine into the "future" tank, which is a JET ENGINE with a 1700+ degree exhaust], while radar signatures can be reduced by use of some of the aircraft industry's stealth techniques. Noise can be reduced too, and one of the benefits of the M1's (and presumably T-80's) gas turbine engine is that it is extremely quiet [So are rotary engines, yet the armor community ignores them], the tracks being the major contributor to the vehicle's noise signature [They MORE than make up for any "quietness" produced by a turbine, especially on the M1 where
each of it's 144 links weighs 90lbs].

The protection levels of future tanks, therefore, will be considerably enhanced by a combination of new armors (ERA and active armor) [2009 --- tanks aren't a whole lot tougher than they were when this was published], enhanced survivability measures to counter the effect of penetration, and a continuing increase in indirect protection. The end result is likely to be that MBTs will be much harder to acquire, track, and hit, and even a hit will not, as is the case even now, guarantee incapacitation of the target. These advances will go a long way to counter the projected firepower enhancements.

In mobility terms, modern MBTs offer levels of agility, speed, and maneuverability far in excess of those  Then, Centurion with its 650-bhp engine could muster 25 mph as against today's Challenger which can achieve 56 kph from its Perkins CV 12 1,200-bhp engine, a figure which itself is low when compares to T-80's 75 kph [The T-80 is about the same size and weight as the Centurion, but has 50% more power --- so, why is it so hard to figure out why the T-80 is a lot faster? Maybe to the author, it's a complex idea...]. A better measure of agility, perhaps is power to weight ratio. Centurion had a power to weight ratio of 12.7 bhp/ton, compared to Leopard 2's 27 bhp/ton [Now he's comparing the power/weight ratio of the Centurion to a DIFFERENT TANK --- and it seems he forgot all about the whole point; TOP SPEED!]. However, engine power and power-to-weight ratio alone do not dictate an MBT's mobility. Many other factors, like ground pressure, length-to-width ratio, track design, and so on all play their part.

Modern MBTs are powered by either conventional diesel or gas turbine. Such engines currently generate between 900 and 1500 bhp to power their highly agile charges. It is generally thought that 1500 bhp will remain the standard power
required for a 45-65-ton MBT, and attention in the future will tend to be focused on how to make tank power packs smaller, more efficient, and more reliable.

Here, the gas turbine engine has an undoubted advantage [FALSE! Gulping down 500 gallons of fuel in only 8 hours at the same power and technology level as a V-12 that takes 72 hours to consume the same fuel... is NOT EFFICIENT. Nor is breaking-down every 152 miles more reliable! Nor does it matter if it's smaller or lighter, if you don't have to remove it for repairs every 152 miles.]. It is inherently more compact and lighter than a conventional diesel engine [...which is a red-flag warning that this is to facilitate incessant removal and total rebuilding], and also more reliable on account of its simpler design [Just a repetition of what I already disproved]. Turbine engines are now in service with the two major tank-producing nations of the world, the U.S. and Russia [Not for long --- after their dismal performance in the Second Chechen War, Russia is phasing them out, and has vowed to NEVER AGAIN buy turbine-powered tanks. The US military is still living in La-La Land], and it is unlikely that such technically sophisticated nations introduced gas turbine engines in M1 and T-80 without careful thought [Both did so ONLY for vanity, because in the 1970s, Gas Turbines were "cool"]. It is true that these engines use considerably more fuel than normal diesel engines, but much of this is consumed during the engine idling time that takes up so much of an MBT's battlefield day [...thus implying that the failing is it's own excuse]. The U.S., whose M1 uses roughly twice the fuel that Challenger does [The M1 has EIGHT TIMES the fuel consumption of the Challenger], is now actively considering the installation of an auxiliary power unit to reduce fuel consumption [Which would never have been necessary to begin with, had the M1 used a Diesel engine all along].

Because of these advantages [Dufus!], therefore, it seems likely that progressively more and more MBTs will be powered by turbine engines, and by 2010 will be the first choice of tank designers [What is this guy smoking?! Has even a SINGLE new model of tank with a Gas turbine engine entered production since 1980? NO! Were there ANY tanks planned or in development in 1993 with a turbine engine? NO! By the year 2009, has a SINGLE new model of tank with a turbine engine ever entered production? NO!]. There remains considerable scope for further development of these engines [For AIRCRAFT!], and use of adiabatic technology and transverse mounting may allow for shorter and lighter hulls. The combination of turbine engines of increasing power and the decreased weight [The Leopard 2, Ariete, K2, Type 99, Challenger 2, Arjun, and M-2001 ALL have as much horsepower as the M1 --- without turbines --- and the M1 is the HEAVIEST MBT in the Western World (and in fact, in ALL THE WORLD). Meanwhile, the T-80 is the HEAVIEST MBT in the Eastern World. Who does this gut think he's fooling?] of hulls could produce a significant increase in the MBT's mobility and agility [Returning to base to spend 2 hours refueling and changing your V-filters every 3 hours ISN'T HIGH MOBILITY. Neither is burning 500 gallons of fuel in under 8 hours].

Of all the other factors that determine a tank's mobility, perhaps one of the most important is suspension design. Challenger, Leopard 2, and the like have improved suspension with greater wheel play, which allows cross-country bumps and dips to be tackled at speed without disruption or injury to the crew. It is interesting to note that Chieftain's poor mobility is not engine-limited, despite the disastrous early days of the L 60 engine [What about that OTHER Chieftain engine disaster he isn't telling us about? The UK tried to power the Chieftain with a GAS TURBINE! Only, unlike the US military (which has been in total denial from day 1) the British Army was quick to realize the Logistical Ball & Chain a turbine would create, and because of this declared this engine a FAILURE!]. Recently, a Chieftain fitted with hydrostrut suspension - a development of Challenger's excellent hydrogas system - proved considerably more mobile across country.

While such suspension systems represent a considerable improvement over what went before, there is even greater scope for improvement using active suspension. Now, active suspension systems are not exactly new, having been tested in
prototype form on the US/FRG MBT-70 project and indeed being used currently by
the Swedish "S" Type tank to lay and aim the gun. However, these suspensions are programmed by crew input, and are used in static situations or preprograrnmed maneuvers. The real advantage of active suspension will be revealed when it operates automatically, for example "seeing" when the tank is about to encounter a ditch and altering the suspension accordingly [Or, you can give the driver a simpler, faster interface, and a faster-reacting suspension --- why must everything this guy says be so complex?]. This technology is by no means yet mature [It still isn't in 2009], but by the next century should allow MBTs to travel at considerable speed across the roughest terrain.

It will be in the field of automation, however, encompassing ADP, fire control computers, information and control systems, and so on, that will make the major impact on MBT design over the next 20 years. Although fire control computers like
Chieftain's Improved Fire Control System have been around for some time, only recently has the full potential of computer technology for future tanks begun to be realized [They're still saying that now, in 2009 --- and they're still wrong].

A host of functions and actions that at present require crewman input could be automated [Like the ability to perform maintenence while someone mans the Driver's Station, Gunner's Station, and Radio (TC's Station), all at once?]. In particular, it has long been realized that the tank commander is overloaded, and attempts are now being made to lessen his burden. Most nations have some active research into this area underway. The U.S. has its Battlefield Management System, while the UK is busy formulating its requirements for its Battlefield Information Command and Control System. The French have recently fielded a system in Leclerc.

So, what will such systems offer the MBT crewman in the future? The attributes of an information and control system can be divided into several broad functional areas: these are, the provision of computer-generated mapping, some sort of land navigation system, the maintenance of a data base of information on the enemy, friendly forces, minefields etc., and the handling of messages [...which are all easily compromised by viruses, hackers, weather, terrain, triple-canopy jungle, and jamming]. All of these will have implications for the future and can be considered both individually and collectively.

Computer-generated mapping, presented on VDUs, will allow a large store of terrain data to be presented as required to MBT crews [Who decides what is "required"? General Bootshine, drinking Espresso at the $3000 desk in his air-conditioned at Fort Comfort?]. Information on, say, routes and obstacles can be demanded and presented either isolated from, or integrated with, the main geographical map. New information on enemy locations and forces can be plotted and automatically transmitted to friendly vehicles to ensure an all-informed intelligence picture [It couldn't be done then, it can't be done now. The sophistication of computer technology is not the problem --- it's the APPLICATION that's the problem]. Indeed, it may be possible to integrate the MBT's fire control laser and navigation system with the computer map, so that enemy vehicles identified and ranged by an individual tank are automatically plotted on every friendly MBT's system.

Additionally, more formal orders can be planned and plotted in graphic overlay form [I'm sure tankers everywhere are THRILLED at the prospect of getting slapped in the face with a compulsory Powerpoint briefing every minute or two...]. New French Leclerc MET will include a battlefield management system to help simplify the tank commander's workload, and transmitted </b>without need for hard copy </b>[...and likely without the ABILITY to make a hard copy --- all the better for the guys at the top of the totem pole say, "But there's no RECORDS that I ordered my tanks to gun-down all those civilians!"]. The amount of paper which presently encumbers tank commanders may be dramatically reduced [...or, you could try doing your paperwork in an OFFICE], and the days of trying to refold a large map while closed down and moving at speed cross-country [What does a complex, Rube Goldbergian C3I network have to do
with maps? You DON'T NEED all that overhead to use a hand-held GPS, compass,
and hand-held digital map device --- which don't even need to be PART OF THE
TANK] may well be drawing to a close.

Closely allied to computer-generated mapping is the land navigation system. No matter how skillful at reading a map they may be, most MBT commanders spend much time and effort in trying to map read themselves from location to location,
especially at night and in low visibility. Any tank commander who claims to
never have been lost must be treated with suspicion, and the burden is particularly great on subunit commanders [Hey, now there's a great idea --- more micromanagement and over-commanding than EVER BEFORE! Let's destroy every last ounce of TC initiative we can, and that will make make future battles a WHOLE LOT easier!]. A navigation aid will be a great assistance to tank crew efficiency and need not demand pinpoint accuracy; up to plus or minus 100 meters is probably sufficient for almost all situations. Provision of this facility will signify a major breakthrough in relieving overload on commanders [The ones at the top --- now they can totally control EVERY DETAIL THEY CAN SEE... which won't be much, because two eyes can only be upon one location at any one time].

It is obvious that maintenance of a comprehensive and up-to-date database is fundamental to the whole concept. The scope for storage of information is enormous and only limited by the capacity of the software. On top of the terain data stowed for the computer mapping, the database must contain details of enemy strengths, locations, equipment, and the same for friendly forces. It must also contain, although not necessarily on every MBT, details of own unit personnel, equipment, logistic requirements, and so on [The CO is supposed to know all these things WITHOUT a computer to begin with; it's called, "paying attention to the forces you command", and there is NO NEED for a machine to outsource keeping track of these things from the CO's noggin --- unless said CO is TOO INCOMPETANT to pay any attention to the status of HIS OWN UNIT]. It should give the commander a constantly updated situation report on his own troops, with details like vehicle readiness, ammunition states, vehicle and personnel casualties, and estimated repair times of damaged tanks, among other items [Two words; INFORMATION. OVERLOAD. Have the information with you that you SHOULD --- not what you CAN. That's never required a computer, either].

All this information will then enable the final attribute of such systems, that of automatic message sending. Commanders at all levels are burdened by a large number of reports and returns which must be sent to enable others to produce relevant plans for future operations and logistic resupply [...and somehow by
replacing paper with electricity, this will change?]. Future information and control systems will be able to produce such reports and returns without crew input [BAD news. If you can't be certain your own men gave you a report, how can you be certain that an enemy ELINT Hacker  hasn't done so?]; MBTs will produce the information [...thus guaranteeing that a sense of responsibility never takes shape in junior officers], either automatically or when demanded by the commander's vehicle system.

The introduction of such a capability has major implications. Not only has the tank commander's workload been considerably reduced, allowing him to concentrate on fighting his vehicle and subunit, but all MBTs in a group will have instant access to intelligence information [...as well as for the enemy, who can kill a tank crew, and copy EVERYTHING from this network onto a datastick from this tank, before anyone figures them out]. Some nations have already begun to plan how they might modify their tactical groupings to take advantage of these new facilities. For example, it may no longer be necessary for troop leaders to provide an interim level of command between tank squadron leader and individual MBTs [Great... MORE ranks of officers hiding in air-conditioned, maximum-security bunkers, hundreds of miles from danger. That's the whole driving force behind "Network-Centric Warfare", isn't it?: Bald-faced Command cowardice]. With the instant access to information provided by an information and control system, the squadron leader may easily command up to 15 vehicles directly [...and incessantly, without ANY initiative on the part of their subordinates].

The implication that is exciting tank designers, however, is one of crew size. It is possible to provide these facilities to any crew member and this, allied to the commander's reduced workload, may mean that by judicious reallocation of tasks and transfer or duplication of operating controls, crew numbers may be further reduced [...until we get fully-automated machines that enemy hackers and/or viruses can remotely reprogram to attack friendlies, complete with a newly-installed program to force these computers to ignore all subsequent orders]. The two-man crew becomes a distinct possibility [Only with a Driver and a Gunner], where each member has a common crew station which allows him to drive, command, fire the gun, and operate radios and other equipment as necessary [...thus turning tankers into a "jack of all trades, and a master of none"]. A two-man crew, in turn, may allow reduction in the size of the MBT [...which has already been EASILY accomplished WITHOUT reducing the crew. Behold the 40-ton EE-T1 Osorio, with all the firepower, protection, and mobility of the M1 Abrams, at half the size and weight ---WITHOUT having to reduce the crew from four!], thus enhancing survivability.

Having said all that, the two-man crew concept is probably unlikely to be in service in any great numbers before 2010 [As of 2009, these concepts are all still pie in the sky]. So, having given a resume of likely future developments in firepower, protection, mobility, and automation, we must return to the original question of how the tank will develop over the next 20 years or so. It would be timid not to make a speculative judgment as to what form it might take. The task is made Considerably easier if we can divide the predictions into two; that is to say, what sort of tank might be produced by a major tank producing power in the period 2000-2010, and what might be produced after 2010.

There seems little doubt that a tank introduced into service in the first period will have a conventional powder gun. This gun will almost certainly be smoothbore [The Arjun has a RIFLED bore, Mr. Foresight], unless the UK continues with its ill-judged commitment to the rifled barrel, and will fire KE and CE fin-stabilized ammunition [Kissing-@$$ to US/NATO groupthinkers much?]. The CE round is not likely to have an antiarmor role [...like in 2003, when a Challenger 2 accidentally destroyed another Challenger 2 with a HESH round (a CE round), in spite of the fact that this was supposed to be an impossible feat to achieve against the MOST-HEAVILY-ARMORED TANK IN THE WORLD?], but may well be able to be proximity-fused for anti-helicopter use. The gun will be fed by an autoloader, and the crew will be reduced to three. This may also allow the MBT to have a low profile or reduced volume turret. Armor protection will be provided by a
combination of laminate armor and ERA, and protection against overfly top attack will be incorporated. Towards the end of the period, active armor may be
introduced, probably in the form of an autonomous radar-controlled gun turret to acquire and shoot down incoming missiles and TGSMs [So... this guy wants to put a turret... on top of another turret... with all that gadgetry inside of it? Hell, why stop there when we can make a TOTEM POLE of stacked turrets!]. The vehicle is as likely to be powered by a gas turbine as a conventional diesel engine, probably of around 1,500 bhp [Yeah, because we all know how POPULAR Gas Turbines are --- look at all the different types of tanks that used them in 1993; the Strv-103, the T-80, the M1 Abrams... um... that's it. No changes to that between then and 2009, either --- and no indication that any Gas Turbine tanks are in development, planned, or even STILL WANTED]; if the former, an auxiliary power unit will be used to reduce fuel consumption at idle [Or, you could just stop fooling around with technology whose only justification for use in a tank is VANITY, and use DIESEL engines]. An information and control system will be incorporated, considerably reducing the crew's workload [That doesn't change their workload --- it only transforms manual labor into systems management] and perhaps allowing modification of tactical groupings by removing some interim levels of command [Or, maybe you can eliminate superfluous elements from the command structure WITHOUT gizmorific new vehicles as excuse? The Soviet Union did it in 1936-1938, and they didn't need computers to finish the job].

After 2010, the design of MBTs may go through a quite radical change </b>[Let's give the Internet a once-over... nope --- all of the tanks in development STILL look like regular tanks!]. The maturing of EM gun technology will greatly simplify gun control systems [Don't you mean, OVERLOAD them?]and reduce ammunition size. The gun will certainly be autoloaded and may well be mounted externally [The only EGT I know of is used on the Stryker MGS, which is neither a tank, nor a SUCCESS], thus reducing the vulnerability of the crew compartment [By putting them all into a tinier space, so one round can more easily kill them all? Or maybe that the force of exploding charges inside the turret will STILL crush the hull below?]. The KE round will be effective against armored ground targets and all but the fastest of air targets because of its high velocity. It will also fire a slower,
general purpose secondary round for general support tasks. Armored protection
will now be by a combination of laminate, reactive, and active armors, and the
full impact of stealth technology will have made the MBT much harder to acquire [Not unless you've found a way to make a tank invisible to the naked eye ---
sensors don't count for much during a ground battle in broad daylight]. Diesel
engines will have given way to gas turbines [HellOOOoooo, Earth to
Crawford?! Only THREE production tanks have EVER used Gas Turbines by 1993,
this hasn't changed by 2009, and all indications are that it will NEVER change.
Turbines have gone the way of so many other dead-end 1970s fads, like Nehru
suits, 8-track players, and disco balls!], which will be more compact and
mounted transversely to save space and weight. Active suspension will enable
high-speed, cross-country movement. Most significantly, automation will truly
have come of age, and the introduction of the common crew station concept will
have allowed crew reduction to two, each able to perform all functions
within the vehicle [How about maneuvering the tan while simultaneously
operating the gun in degraded mode, if one of the two crewmen is DEAD?].
Interim levels of command, for example, at troop leader level, will have disappeared, and sustainability in continuous operations will be achieved by
alternate crews moving up under light armor during replenishment.

There will be those, of course, who say that by 2010 there will be no need for the MBT on the battlefield [They're idiots --- why even mention them?]. Other weapon systems, for example the armored helicopter, will have greater flexibility and sustainability [Like the AH-64 Apache? 300 of them had to be grounded for spare parts in 1991, while the REMAINING 274 went to Desert Shield, and in the end they only destroyed 500 tanks while 110 A-10s destroyed 1000+ tanks, because the AH-64s spent most of that time husbanding parts --- and even THAT dismal result was only due to hundreds of civilian contractors working on them night and day, who would never have been doing so otherwise]. These prophets must be reminded that by 2010 the "threat vacuum"; into which the helicopter has developed will be filled with sophisticated anti-helicopter systems [It's 2009 --- where ARE these "threats"?], and its vulnerability will make it a fragile asset to be carefully conserved [As I just pointed out two comments ago, it already WAS from the very start]. We have yet to see attack helicopters used extensively in mechanized operations [Maybe because helicopters don't have TRACKS?] against first class opposition. What is certain is that helicopters cannot carry the fight forward to the enemy in the face of heavy fire, nor can they assault a strongly fortified and stoutly defended position without heavy casualties [We already learned this in VIETNAM --- got anything original to tell us? Like maybe something relevant to Ground Warfare?]. They do not have the ability to absorb punishment and continue operating, one of the fundamental attributes of the tank. It is for reasons such as these that no one weapons system is likely to be able to take the place of the MBT on the battlefields over the next 20 years [You could have told that to the US Army, whose Stryker Brigades have caused 200 needless deaths and thousands of injuries]. The tanks innate ability to create and
maintain shock action, by a combination of its attributes of firepower, mobility, and protection, and the fact that it is able to continue to exploit its own success, make it certain that it will remain as the commander's main asset in future highly mobile and intensive mechanized operations.

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  Major S. W. Crawford graduated from Cambridge University in 1976 with an MA in Land Economy.
  After three years in civilian employment, he entered the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in 1979. On commissioning, he joined the 4th Royal Tank Regiment in Munster, Germany.
  After completing the British Army Staff Course, he served as a weapons technical officer on the staff of the
Director, Royal Armoured Corps. He returned to the 4th RTR in 1989 as a squadron leader, serving six months as part of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus.
  He became OIC of the Regiment in October 1990, but was extracted and sent to HQ, British Forces Middle East in Riyadh during the Gulf War.
  At present, he is attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth.